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Increasing and Decreasing Inequalities of Power:  
A Processual View. A Response to Cas Wouters, and 
a Proposal for Clarification 
Nico Wilterdink ∗ 
Abstract: »Zunehmende und abnehmende Machtungleichheiten: eine prozess-
soziologische Perspektive. Eine Antwort auf Cas Wouters und ein Vorschlag zur 
Verdeutlichung«. Responding to an essay by Cas Wouters in this journal, this 
article aims to clarify historical trends of increasing and decreasing power ine-
qualities. It criticizes Wouters’s rejection of the notion of “functional de-
democratisation,” his claim that “functional democratisation” was a dominant 
trend in the whole of human history, and his idea that this process results from 
long-term trends of differentiation and integration. This paper specifies when 
and under which conditions processes of functional democratisation did occur, 
and when and under which conditions developments in the direction of grow-
ing power inequality were dominant. Explanations for trends in these different 
directions are advanced. The paper’s final section argues that for the past 40 
years processes of both functional democratisation and functional de-
democratisation can be discerned, which take place on different integration 
levels and along different axes.  
Keywords: Power balances, interdependence, social inequalities, functional de-
mocratisation, functional de-democratisation, integration, Norbert Elias. 
1. Introduction 
Back in 1976, Cas Wouters published a paper in a Dutch sociological journal 
with the title “Is het civilisatieproces van richting veranderd?” (“Has the civi-
lising process changed direction?”). The question had been raised by two other 
young sociologists, who had published an article in the same journal in which 
they observed that behavioural and emotional standards in the Netherlands 
since the 1950s had changed in a direction that seemed to contradict, at first 
sight, Elias’s theory of the civilising process: moral prescriptions had become 
less strict, the social space to follow personal preferences had widened, and the 
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recognition and acceptation of formerly forbidden emotions – such as sexual 
feelings outside the confines of marriage – had increased. The authors conclud-
ed that Elias’s theory allowed for different interpretations of these changes: in 
some respects, they could be regarded as a continuation of the civilising pro-
cess; in other respects, they indicated a change of direction (Brinkgreve and 
Korzec 1976a, 1976b, 1979). In his critical response, Wouters (1976) rejected 
this ambiguous conclusion: the civilising process, he argued, has not changed 
direction. The observed changes were part of a new stage in this process, for 
which he introduced a new concept: informalisation. The relaxation of behav-
ioural standards implied by informalisation did not signify a decrease of self-
constraint but, on the contrary, built upon levels of self-constraint that had been 
attained in preceding stages of the civilising process, and signified a continua-
tion of this process according to the criteria advanced by Elias (2012a): more 
even affect control, more social constraint toward self-constraint, diminishing 
contrasts, increasing varieties (see also Wouters 1977; Mennell 1989, 241-6).  
In the subsequent decades, Wouters elaborated the notion of informalisation 
in a number of interesting and insightful articles and books based on the study 
of series of manner books in several countries (e.g., Wouters 2004, 2007). 
Again and again, he repeated, confirmed, and illustrated his thesis that the 
dominant tendency in Western societies since the end of the 19th century has 
been one of informalisation, a process in which the rules of everyday social 
interactions have become less strict, less rigid, more flexible, less bound to 
status differences, and more dependent on varying social situations. Through 
informalisation, the process of civilisation has continued in the same direction. 
The strength of this oeuvre is that it sticks to one big idea, which is elaborated 
in various ways and illustrated with numerous empirical examples. 
More than 40 years after his first publication, Wouters (2020) in an article in 
this journal raises the same question again: “Have civilising processes changed 
direction?” And again, as was to be expected, the answer is negative. As he 
concludes in the final sentence, “the direction of the civilising process has 
continued” (2020, 332). Like before, informalisation is conceived of as the 
continuation of this process. But now, another concept is put in the centre, 
which is supposed to be immediately connected with informalisation: function-
al democratisation. Instead of dealing with changes in manners, behavioural 
standards, social interaction codes, and emotional controls, the article focuses 
on macrosocial changes in power structures.1 Here, Wouters seeks another, less 
direct confirmation of his idea of an ongoing process of civilisation-and-
informalisation – by relating it to “functional democratisation.” He seems to 
 
1  Earlier papers with similar arguments are Wouters (2016; 2019). 
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assume that if and only if functional democratisation is the dominant trend, 
informalisation and, by implication, civilisation will continue.2 
While Wouters addresses important questions in this article, the way he 
deals with them leaves much to be desired. The article abounds with vague and 
unclear statements, unfair and ill-founded criticisms of other sociologists who 
share with him the Eliasian approach, and generalisations that are at odds with 
accepted historical and sociological knowledge. I will not deal with everything 
in his essay that is, in my view, unclear or incorrect. My criticism will focus 
successively on three points: 1) Wouters’s rejection of the notion of functional 
de-democratisation; 2) his claim that functional democratisation is a long-term 
trend in the whole of human history; and 3) his explanation of processes of 
functional democratisation as “side effects” of differentiation and integration 
processes. 
This article is not only a response to Wouters’s essay. It aims to clarify and 
specify Elias’s notion of functional democratisation, to elucidate historical 
processes of increasing and decreasing power inequalities, and to propose 
explanations for these processes on the basis of a figurational, processual per-
spective. The final section focuses on recent developments in which, as I argue, 
processes of functional democratisation and de-democratisation go together.  
2. The Concepts of “Functional Democratisation” and 
“Functional De-Democratisation” 
When Elias introduced the concept of “functional democratisation” in 1970, the 
processes to which it refers were visible in all Western societies. The preceding 
two decades had witnessed not only unprecedented economic growth, but also 
decreasing income and wealth inequality, the formation and extension of the 
welfare state, and the growing significance of emancipation movements of 
ethnic-racial minorities, women and youth groups. These processes of postwar 
democratisation and dehierarchisation were accelerations of a historical devel-
opment in which, as Elias (2012b, 61) put it, “societies oligarchically ruled by 
 
2  I will not discuss this assumption here; this would require dealing with much-debated 
problems concerning the assessment and interpretation of processes of civilisation and in-
formalisation (cf. Wilterdink 1984; Mennell 1989, 227-50; Wouters and Mennell 2015). The 
main question in this context, which Wouters (2020) does not answer clearly, is how func-
tional democratisation and informalisation are interconnected. While he contends that 
functional democratisation is a dominant trend throughout human history (see below in the 
text), he regards informalisation as a phase in the civilising process that has become domi-
nant only since the second half of the 19th century, after a preceding phase in which “for-
malisation” was dominant (Wouters 2020, 294). Accordingly, functional democratisation 
would not always and automatically bring about informalisation, but only from a certain 
stage of development. 
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the hereditary privileged were transformed into societies ruled by the recallable 
representatives of mass political parties.” In general terms, power differences 
within Western state-societies had diminished over the past centuries. Two 
interconnected aspects of this development were crucial: “the reduction of 
power differentials between governments and governed” and “the reduction of 
power differentials between different strata” (ibid., 61-3). “Functional democ-
ratisation” was the term that Elias proposed to refer to this “overall trend” of 
decreasing power differences.  
Elias did not assume or suggest that this process would continue forever. 
Some ten to twenty years later, counter tendencies in Western societies became 
manifest. From the 1980s, income and wealth inequalities started to grow, 
labour unions lost members and bargaining power, social expenditures were 
reduced, taxes for the rich were lowered, and national governments increasing-
ly tended to bend their policies in favour of the interests of big companies and 
capital owners. Referring to such changes, Stephen Mennell (2007, 250-4, 311-
4) introduced the concept of functional de-democratisation in his book on the 
society in which these changes were most apparent, the United States. Indeed, 
many studies (such as Hacker and Pierson 2010; Volscho and Kelly 2012; 
Milanovic 2019, 12-66; Stiglitz 2019; cf. Mennell 2014) since the publication 
of this book have shown how processes of increasing economic power ine-
quality and increasing political power inequality have reinforced one another in 
this society. In a slightly different way, Behrouz Alikhani (2014, 2017) distin-
guished “functional” democratisation and de-democratisation from “institution-
al” and “habitual” (de-)democratisation, and applied these concepts to different 
societies and historical episodes, including recent developments in the United 
States. I have used the concept of functional de-democratisation occasionally to 
refer to interconnected tendencies of increasing economic inequality and in-
creasing political power inequality in the United States and other Western 
societies (Wilterdink 2016; 2017, 31). 
One might expect that this extension of Eliasian theory would be welcomed, 
or at least accepted, by other sociologists who are interested in long-term social 
developments and work in the same theoretical tradition. Wouters, however, 
sharply criticises Mennell and, to a lesser extent, Alikhani and me for our use 
of the concept of “functional de-democratisation.” The grounds for his criti-
cism are not very clear. In any case, his objections are not empirical: like the 
criticised authors, Wouters recognises tendencies of growing social inequality 
in Western societies and beyond, and at the end of his paper he even speaks of 
“a reversal of democratisation” – “de-democratisation” (2020, 325). Yet he 
sticks to the idea that functional democratisation continues to be the dominant 
overall trend in history, and he goes so far as to reject the very notion of func-
tional de-democratisation. It is not easy to understand why, but his paper sug-
gests a number of reasons: a) the concept remains unclear and unspecified; b) if 
there is de-democratisation, it is not “functional”; c) the criticised authors adopt 
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a “western-centred perspective” (ibid., 305); and d) it is a “theoretical error” to 
suggest that the concept has the same explanatory power as “its counterpart of 
‘functional democratisation’” (ibid., 306). All these reasons are, in my view, 
insufficient, and manifest an inflexible, dogmatic, and essentialist interpretation 
of Eliasian sociology. And, as is often the case, the disciple is more dogmatic 
than his master.  
(a) Contrary to what Wouters suggests, the meaning of the concept of func-
tional de-democratisation is as clear as that of its counterpart: it refers to a 
reversal of functional democratisation, that is, to trends of increasing power 
disparities. Such trends are manifested and indicated by growing social ine-
qualities, such as economic inequalities of income, wealth and work conditions, 
political inequalities in legal rights and access to decision-making bodies, and 
status inequalities.3 In the figurational view, these social inequalities are con-
ceived as manifestations and indications of “underlying” power differences (cf. 
Weber 1978, 926-55). Wouters remarks that “‘functional democratisation’ is 
compatible with increasing social inequality” (2020, 303). This is correct if one 
reads this as: “‘functional democratisation’ in certain respects is compatible 
with increasing social inequality in other respects.” With the same provisions, 
one can say that functional de-democratisation is compatible with decreasing 
social inequality. Trends of functional democratisation and functional de-
democratisation may go together. The question is when, where, and how they 
actually go together. 
To use both concepts fruitfully, they need empirical specification. Elias in-
troduced the concept of functional democratisation in his book on the funda-
mentals of sociology, Was ist Soziologie?, arguing that the emergence of soci-
ology was connected with a basic transformation of European societies in the 
direction of decreasing power disparities. This process of functional democrati-
sation pertained to “the development of most European societies in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries” (Elias 2012b, 60) or, in slightly different formu-
lations, to “the more developed countries in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries,” or to “the direction of social development over the last two or three 
hundred years” (ibid., 62). While somewhat imprecise and not wholly con-
sistent in his empirical references, Elias clearly refers here to specific societies 
in a specific historical period. In contrast, Wouters unspecifies the concept and 
blows it up to universal proportions (see section 3 below). 
(b) “In what sense is this de-democratisation functional?” Wouters asks 
(2020, 305; italics in the original). The same question, which he does not ad-
dress, can be asked about democratisation: in what sense is democratisation 
functional?  
 
3  In another paper I deal more systematically and extensively with the criteria for assessing 
trends of functional democratisation and de-democratisation (Wilterdink 2020). 
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Why did Elias use the prefix “functional”? First, it was a way to distinguish 
the concept from democratisation in the narrower, political or institutional sense. 
Political or institutional democratisation is not “in contrast” with functional 
democratisation (as Wouters writes on p. 299), but one of its manifestations. In 
seeking to distinguish functional democratisation from political democratisation, 
Elias was very far from using the terms “function” and “functional” in the sense 
that was current in mainstream sociology at the time he was writing Was ist 
Soziologie? (1970), when “functionalism” was the dominant theoretical ap-
proach. He does not use the concept of function to mean activities or tendencies 
that serve to uphold and maintain the prevailing “social system.” Elias explicates 
that later in the book, after he has already introduced the term “functional de-
mocratisation” (Elias 2012b, 71 ff.). Here he points out that 
the concept of function must be understood as a concept of relationship. We 
can only speak of social functions when referring to interdependences which 
constrain people to a greater or lesser extent. […] To understand the concept 
of “function” in this way demonstrates its connection with power within hu-
man relationships. People or groups that have functions for each other exer-
cise constraint over each other. Their potential for withholding from each oth-
er what they require is usually uneven, which means that the constraining 
power of one side is greater than that of the other. (Elias 2012b, 73; italics in 
original) 
Thus, a specific reason for Elias to use the adjective “functional” in connection 
to democratisation was that it relates directly to changing power ratios in a 
social figuration. It points to the basic explanation: functional democratisation 
is rooted in changes in the Funktionszusammenhänge, the “functional nexuses” 
among interdependent people (Elias 2006a, 84-90; 2012b, 60-5). Functional 
democratisation occurs when less powerful groups become functionally more 
important for more powerful groups – when the relations of interdependence 
become stronger, less one-sided, and more reciprocal, and as a consequence, 
the power balances more evenly. 
For exactly the same reasons, we can speak of functional de-
democratisation. The prefix indicates that the process comprises much more 
than political or institutional de-democratisation, which is one of its possible 
manifestations. And second, functional de-democratisation is rooted in changes 
in the functional nexuses among interdependent people. It occurs when less 
powerful groups become functionally less important for more powerful groups, 
or when relatively powerful groups strengthen their functions with respect to 
less powerful groups. In this process, interdependencies become more one-
sided and less reciprocal, and power relations more unequal. There is no reason 
to reserve the adjective “functional” only for processes of decreasing power 
differences, unless one defines “functional” – in line with sociological func-
tionalism (Parsons 1951; Merton 1968) but contrary to the figurational view 
(Elias 2012b, 71-4, 121-2; see also Goudsblom 1977, 175-80) – as good for the 
social system, or as intrinsically good. 
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(c) The three criticised authors adopt, according to Wouters (2020, 305), “a 
largely western-centred perspective on globalisation”: “they ignore the possi-
bility that, when industries, capital, and commerce were moved to cheap-labour 
countries, functional democratisation continued on the corresponding higher 
(global) level of integration.”  
Far from ignoring this “possibility,” however, I have advanced it in several 
writings (though without using the term “functional democratisation”). The 
tenor of the quoted statement is quite similar to what I wrote in my article in 
Historical Social Research to which Wouters refers. I noticed there tendencies 
of functional de-democratisation within Western state-societies since the 
1980s, but: 
The picture is different when we look at socioeconomic inequalities on a global 
scale […]. To put it schematically: increasing economic inequality within coun-
tries (in Western but also most non-Western) countries is accompanied by a 
tendency of decreasing economic inequality between countries (Milanovic 
2016). Both tendencies can be plausibly related to globalisation: the extension 
of interdependencies at transnational and global levels. The relocation of la-
bour-intensive manufacturing industries and the growth of investment flows 
from richer to poorer countries weakened the position of workers in the rich 
countries and contributed to economic growth in poorer regions, thereby nar-
rowing the gap with richer countries. (Wilterdink 2017, 31-2)  
Wouters ignores this passage, as he ignores my previous work to which it is 
related (e.g., Wilterdink 2000b, 2002).  
If there is a tendency of functional democratisation on a global scale, that 
does not preclude, of course, tendencies of functional de-democratisation with-
in Western state-societies. It is not “Western-centric” to focus on Western 
societies, as Elias did when he proposed the concept of functional democratisa-
tion to characterize modern developments in European societies, or as Mennell 
did when he advanced the idea that there were recent tendencies of functional 
de-democratisation in the United States and other Western societies. It is West-
ern-centric to generalise from these societies to all human societies without 
serious study. Wouters does precisely that when he declares the processes of 
functional democratisation observed in the history of Western societies to be 
universal in the whole of human history.  
(d) While decreasing social inequalities reflect “functional democratisation,” 
its counterpart “functional de-democratisation” cannot be used, according to 
Wouters (2020, 306), to explain increasing social inequalities: to “link the 
dubious concept of functional de-democratisation to the rise of social inequali-
ties, suggesting that it has similar explanatory power as its counterpart of ‘func-
tional democratisation’ is a theoretical error that stems mainly from a one-
dimensional view of the connection between lengthening chains of interde-
pendence and social equalisation.”  
This is hard to follow. Wouters does not explain why he thinks that Mennell, 
Alikhani, or I have a “one-dimensional view of the connection between length-
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ening chains of interdependence and social equalisation,” and what kind of 
multi-dimensional view he wants to put in its place. Nor does he make clear 
what this might have to do with a supposed lack of “explanatory power” of the 
concept of functional de-democratisation. In fact, I have advanced an explana-
tion of the transition from a dominant trend of decreasing social inequality 
within Western state-societies (functional democratisation) to one of increasing 
inequality (functional de-democratisation) that rests precisely on the assump-
tion that there is not a “one-dimensional” connection between lengthening 
chains of interdependence and social equalisation or disequalisation. Drawing 
on Elias’s insights and concepts, I developed the thesis that the lengthening and 
intensification of chains of interdependence within Western state-societies 
since the 19th century led to decreasing inequalities, but that the subsequent 
lengthening and intensification of chains of interdependence at transnational 
and global levels that took the upper hand in the last quarter of the 20th century 
led to the weakening of interdependencies within these states and, as a conse-
quence, to increasing inequalities at that level (Wilterdink 1993; 1995; 2000a; 
2016; 2017, 30-1; cf. Mennell 2007, 253-4; 2014). While some remarks in 
Wouters’s paper come close to this line of argumentation, he does not discuss it 
or even refer to it.4 I will return to this in the last section. 
3. Functional Democratisation: When and Where? 
Wouters presents in his article the bold idea that functional democratisation has 
been a dominant trend throughout human history. “Notwithstanding counter 
movements such as the disintegration of the Roman Empire into the Dark Ag-
es,” he writes, “processes of differentiation, integration, and functional democ-
ratisation have been dominant over the whole of human history, and with re-
newed strength and clarity from the 16th century onwards” (Wouters 2020, 
308). Here and at other places, he mentions differentiation, integration and 
functional democratisation in the same breath, suggesting that these three pro-
cesses are inherently interconnected, so that differentiation and integration 
imply functional democratisation. This is an erroneous assumption, as I will 
explain in the next section. 
 
4  Thus, in reference to Mennell (2014) Wouters (2020, 304) remarks: “The observation that 
increasing global interdependence coincides with growing inequality in nation-states seems 
accurate, at least in some states. But Mennell backs this up with a rather casual moral ar-
gument.” However, Mennell does not merely contend that increasing global interdepend-
ence “coincides” with growing inequality in nation-states, but argues that there is causal 
connection between the two. And he backs this up not with a “rather casual moral argu-
ment” but with a sociological argument in which he explicitly refers to my work (Wilterdink 
2000a). 
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There is no empirical evidence that functional democratisation is a dominant 
long-term trend in the whole of human history. On the contrary, there is a lot of 
evidence that power differences within and between human societies grew 
larger in the course of time, particularly since the beginnings of agriculture 
around 11,000 years ago.5 In the transition from hunting-gathering societies to 
agrarian societies, and in the development from relatively simple to more com-
plex agrarian societies, inequalities of power, privileges, and social status in-
creased. Systems of stratification came to develop in which power distances 
between rulers and ruled, landowners and peasants, rich and poor people, high-
er and lower status groups widened.6 It was also in agrarian societies that slav-
ery, the institution in which power inequality was maximised, became wide-
spread. 
All this is nothing new. It is standard knowledge, presented and elaborated 
in numerous historical overviews (Mann 1986; Christian 2004), sociological 
textbooks (Lenski, Nolan, and Lenski 1995), books on social evolution (Sand-
erson and Alderson 2005) and stratification (Lenski 1966), and treatises on 
long-term trends in human history (Goudsblom 1996a). It is confirmed again 
and again by archaeological and historical research (Scheidel 2017). While 
there are disagreements about interpretations and specificities, there is consen-
sus among scholars about the overall direction of the long-term trend. It is, of 
course, legitimate to propose a radical counter thesis, but it is not very produc-
tive to do so without giving any empirical evidence. Wouters does not give 
such evidence. 
Processes of functional democratisation that did occur before the modern era 
can best be understood as temporary counter movements, which took place 
under specific conditions. The most famous example of such a movement is 
what happened in the region and period from which the word “democracy” 
stems: Ancient Greece from about 600 to 350 BCE. In Athens and other city-
states, citizens acquired equal rights, got a say in political and judicial decision-
making, and received payments in land and money for state-services, which 
contributed to a more equal distribution of wealth. This move toward “democ-
racy” can only be understood in the context of intense competitive struggles, 
 
5  One might call this “functional de-democratisation,” but it is better, I think, to reserve this 
term for trends of growing power differences that succeed functional democratisation. 
6  Wouters (2020) took notice of the statement in my HSR article that since the emergence of 
agriculture, power differentials within and between societies increased (Wilterdink 2017, 
29). He comments: “This perspective places too much emphasis on growing inequality, 
thereby idealising previous societies and their simpler organisations as exhibiting greater 
equality” (Wouters 2020, 308, note 10). However, it is not an “idealisation” of previous, less 
differentiated societies to observe that they were relatively egalitarian. By contending that I 
place “too much emphasis on growing inequality,” Wouters apparently recognizes that there 
was such a trend, but also suggests that there was yet another, contrary trend of diminish-
ing inequality – without giving a clue to what this trend might entail, how it could be em-
pirically assessed, or how the two contrary trends might go together. 
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often of a violent nature, among the city-states and with other powers (such as 
the Persian Empire), which required a high degree of military mobilisation 
among the adult male inhabitants. Their rights were connected with the obliga-
tion to fight for their community (Scheidel 2017, 188-99). Given the strong 
inter-state competition and the high military participation ratio (Andreski 
1954), the interdependencies among the citizens of each city-state were strong 
and fairly reciprocal, resulting in relatively equal power balances. While cities 
like Athens around 400 BCE were in certain respects more “democratic” than 
liberal democracies today, as citizens had more direct access to political deci-
sion-making, in other respects this democracy was very limited according to 
modern standards, since women, slaves and foreigners were excluded from 
citizens’ rights. When the city-states lost autonomy as they were incorporated 
into larger state structures (from 146 BCE in the Roman Empire) these limited 
forms of democracy disappeared, and social inequalities started to grow again. 
Similar moves of temporary and limited functional democratisation can be 
found in other places and periods. Thus, in the towns in mediaeval Western 
Europe, which were formed and expanded after 1000 CE and acquired a high 
degree of political autonomy due to feudal fragmentation (Elias 2012a, 224-
58), citizens participated in political decision-making in various ways, such as 
through representative city councils, guild organisations, and the election of 
urban office-holders (Prak 2018, esp. 63 ff.). Sooner or later, however, these 
forms of partial urban democracy were undermined by state centralisation from 
without, oligarchisation from within, or a combination of both. Political de-
democratisation at the local level usually went hand in hand with growing 
economic inequality – for example in the city-states of Northern and Middle 
Italy in the 15th and 16th centuries and in the cities of Holland in the 17th and 
18th centuries, where poverty among the lower classes increased (van Bavel 
2016, 97-207). 
The process of functional democratisation in Western societies to which Eli-
as referred when he introduced the concept was more enduring and on a much 
larger scale. But when did it start? It is difficult to answer this question. As 
noted, Elias was somewhat vague about it. In a paper on the “sociogenesis of 
sociology” he spoke of “a process of increasing democratisation” which “had 
started far back in the history of European societies” and which after the 
French Revolution “reached a stage where no section of society remained unaf-
fected by it” (Elias 1984, 48). In his magnum opus on the civilising process in 
Europe he pointed out that “increasing constraints on the upper class” were 
conditioned by “increasing pressures from below.” Since the late Middle Ages 
the urban bourgeoisie had won power in relation to the nobility, who therefore 
felt increasing pressures to uphold their superior status through further refine-
ment of manners (Elias 2012a, 464-8). As Elias put it in The Court Society, a 
shift in the direction of a loss of power of “the traditional monopoly elites” can 
be observed 
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not only in the period of manifest democratisation in conjunction with advanc-
ing industrialisation, but, in rudimentary form as a kind of latent democratisa-
tion, [already] in societies of the type of the ancien régime, especially in con-
junction with the commercialisation that preceded industrialisation. (Elias 
2006b, 286; 2002, 448) 
Yet it is questionable, in my view, to conclude that overall functional democra-
tisation was the dominant trend in Western Europe in this early modern period. 
The upper layers of the bourgeoisie – merchants, bankers, urban magistrates, 
lawyers, high civil servants – won power not only in relation to the nobility, but 
also with respect to less privileged segments of the population, the peasants, 
craftsmen, labourers, and their families. Whereas inequalities between the 
traditional upper class and the upcoming commercial elite diminished, differ-
ences of power and privilege between these dominant strata and the rest of the 
population widened. According to studies of different European cities and 
regions, economic inequalities increased with the extension of markets, mone-
tarisation and urbanisation (Soltow and van Zanden 1998; van Bavel 2016; 
Scheidel 2017, 91-101). Merchants and wealthy capital owners stimulated 
these developments and profited from them, whereas the incomes of peasants 
and small farmers, craftsmen, and wage workers stagnated or declined. The 
relations of interdependence between these categories became more one-sided 
and less reciprocal, power balances more uneven. While the French Revolution 
was a revolt in the name of “the people” uniting different classes against the 
monarchy and the court nobility, it resulted in only a limited and short-time 
levelling of material living conditions. The revolution marked the transition to 
the new capitalist regime in France and other countries of the European conti-
nent (in Britain, this change took off earlier and was more gradual) in which 
the principle of equality before the law combined with a “proprietarian” ideol-
ogy which allowed for further increases of wealth and income inequality 
(Piketty 2020, 99-200). The Industrial Revolution from the late 18th century 
provided new opportunities of wealth accumulation to entrepreneurs and the 
owners of land and capital, whereas the living and labour conditions of the 
working classes worsened (Thompson 1968). It was only in the second half of 
the 19th century with further industrialisation that these conditions started to 
improve considerably, both absolutely and relative to other classes. It was from 
this period onwards that we may speak of an overall process of functional 
democratisation within Western state-societies, which remained the dominant 
trend until about 1980.  
In short, the development of power structures and social inequalities in 
Western Europe since the 16th century was not one of unequivocal “functional 
democratisation,” let alone one of functional democratisation “with renewed 
strength and clarity,” as Wouters (2020, 308) writes. If this does not hold true 
for Western Europe, it is even much further removed from reality in the world 
as a whole. The 15th and 16th centuries witnessed the beginnings of the Euro-
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pean expansion, which, through the combination of trade and violent conquest, 
created enormous inequalities on a global scale. It included the colonisation of 
vast territories in America, Asia, and Africa, and the annihilation, subjugation 
and exploitation of untold numbers of people in these areas (Diamond 1997; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 245-73). Part of this evolving “modern world-
system” (Wallerstein 1974) was the trading and shipping of millions of slaves 
from Africa to the Americas and forcing them – if they had survived the jour-
ney over the Ocean – to work on plantations, where exploitation based on phys-
ical violence was driven to the utmost extremes (Meltzer 1993 II, 25-255). 
Coercive and extreme exploitation was by no means limited to slave labour on 
American plantations. A relatively late instance was the creation of the colony 
of “Congo Free State” in Central Africa by the Belgian King Leopold II in 
1885, where indigenous people were forced to work on rubber plantations, and 
routinely killed or mutilated if they did not attain the requested production 
quotas (Breman 1990; Blom 2008, 92-121). Around 1900, as a result of the 
growing Western dominance in the world since the 16th century, global power 
inequalities were greater than ever before. 
This illustrates that power inequality trends on different integration levels 
can go in different directions. Whereas trends of functional democratisation 
became dominant at the level of nation-states in Western Europe and North 
America in the 19th century, the growth of power inequalities continued at the 
global level, and even attained new intensity at the end of the century. 
As to functional democratisation within Western state-societies, we may dis-
tinguish three phases. The first phase, from about the middle of the 19th centu-
ry until the outbreak of the First World War, was characterised by a gradual 
(though limited) emancipation of the working classes, the introduction of mass 
politics, and the extension of state activities. In this period, parliamentary pow-
er in most states was strengthened, the franchise was extended, political parties 
representing the interests of lower and middle classes were formed, labour 
unions acquired bargaining power, working conditions and working hours were 
regulated, general public education was introduced, and pension schemes, 
insurances for employees, and state-guaranteed social provisions were set up 
(de Swaan 1988). It was also a period of intense rivalries and growing tensions 
between European states, resulting in the First World War. 
The outbreak of this war marked the beginning of the second phase (1914-
1945), characterised by large-scale collective violence, deep social and eco-
nomic crises, and, at the same time, accelerating trends of functional democra-
tisation. In this “age of extremes,” the two world wars made people within each 
of the involved nation-states more mutually interdependent than ever before, 
bringing about more even power balances between social classes. One indica-
tion of this development is the strong decrease of income and wealth inequali-
ties in this period (Piketty 2014). The Great Depression of the 1930s also con-
tributed to this levelling process. Everywhere, governmental control was 
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extended, aimed at the mobilisation, cooperation and loyalty of the whole na-
tional population. In Western liberal democracies, reforms to that purpose – 
such as higher and more progressive taxes – contributed to diminishing class 
inequalities. 
More dramatic transformations took place in Russia, where the revolution of 
1917 established a new order based on a radical communist ideology, and in 
countries in Southern and Central Europe, where fascist regimes took power in 
the 1920s and 1930s. The revolutionary transition from the tsarist Russian 
empire to the Soviet Union in 1917-1921 brought the elimination of the aristoc-
racy and the capital-owning bourgeoisie and a far-reaching levelling of material 
living conditions, carried through by a central government that effectively 
crushed all opposition and monopolised not only the means of violence, but 
also the means of production and the means of orientation (Skocpol 1979, 206-
35). Functional democratisation as indicated by economic inequalities went 
hand in hand with an enormous concentration of political power. 
A comparable “totalitarian” pattern, in spite of all differences, could be 
found in fascist regimes. German National Socialism, in particular, combined 
an anti-democratic and anti-liberal stance with egalitarian and “socialist” ele-
ments, stressing authoritarian leadership and the superiority of the national we-
group on the one hand, and the unity, mutual solidarity and basic equality of all 
members of that we-group on the other. The Nazi regime carried forward the 
break with the monarchical-aristocratic regime that had started with the Wei-
mar Republic and took further steps toward a “classless” national society, while 
excluding and violently persecuting minorities who were defined as not belong-
ing to the national we-group (van Doorn 2007). It is difficult to characterise 
this regime – just like the Soviet regime – in terms of either functional democ-
ratisation or de-democratisation, as it contained elements of both. 
The third phase (1945-1980) that started with the end of the Second World 
War was characterised by strong tensions between the liberal-democratic-
capitalist “West” (including the new Federal Republic of Germany) and the 
communist “East,” respectively under the leadership of the new “superpowers,” 
the United States and the Soviet Union. For the countries of the West it was a 
period of unprecedented economic growth and growing prosperity, in which 
income and wealth inequalities were further reduced, liberal-democratic institu-
tions were consolidated, and welfare state provisions expanded, guaranteeing a 
high degree of material security for large masses of the population. For the first 
time in history, the overwhelming majority of the population in Western coun-
tries attained a standard of living far above subsistence level, consuming “luxu-
ry” goods that only the well-to-do could afford in previous times. International-
ly, European states had lost power after the two devastating wars, which paved 
the way for political independence of the colonies. This decolonisation can be 
regarded as functional democratisation on an international scale, as Wouters 
(2020, 313) rightly remarks. In this same period however, international eco-
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nomic inequality as measured by per-capita national income further increased 
(Bourguignon and Morrison 2002). In economic terms, Western populations as 
a whole developed into a global upper class with a standard of living far above 
that of the large majority of the population of poorer countries.  
How can these various tendencies of functional democratisation and de-
democratisation, decreasing and increasing power disparities be explained? It 
would be beyond the scope of this article to formulate an answer that suggests 
anything like completeness. In the next section, I will focus on the problems of 
explanation raised by Wouters’s essay, critically discussing his proposition that 
processes of functional democratisation are “side effects” of social differentia-
tion and integration. 
4. Differentiation, Integration, and Changing Power 
Balances 
When Elias introduced the concept of functional democratisation as a crucial 
aspect of the development of Western societies over the past centuries, he 
connected it with processes of differentiation and integration: 
Central to this whole social transformation have been impulses towards grow-
ing specialisation or differentiation in all social activities. Corresponding to 
these have been impulses towards integration of the specialised activities [...]. 
Because of their particular specialised functions, all groups and individuals 
become more and more functionally dependent on more and more others. 
Chains of interdependence become more differentiated and grow longer; con-
sequently they become more opaque and, for any single group or individual, 
more uncontrollable. (Elias 2012b, 63-64) 
With these statements Elias probably did not pretend to give a full explanation 
of functional democratisation, though he may have given this impression to 
readers. In his essay “Towards a theory of social processes” he put forward a 
number of interconnected long-term trends that have been dominant in the 
whole of human history. Among them is functional differentiation, a “continu-
ous trend which, despite numerous regressions and counter-trends, is observa-
ble as [a] dominant trend [...] from the earliest times of humankind to our own” 
(Elias 2009, 28). Complementary to this is “the long-term trend towards the 
integration of smaller social units [...] into larger and larger integration-units” 
(ibid., 32). Functional democratisation is not mentioned in this context. 
Functional democratisation is not a process on the same level of generality 
as differentiation and integration, and the three are not intrinsically intercon-
nected. The question then is, under which specific conditions are they interre-
lated? Or, in more general terms, how are long-term processes of differentia-
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tion and integration connected with changes in power inequalities in the direc-
tion of increase or decrease?7 
Rather than assuming that functional democratisation, or decreasing power 
differentials, is a corollary of differentiation and integration there is more to 
say for the opposite thesis: differentiation and integration are fundamental to 
increasing power differences. This is quite evident for the long-term trend of 
growing power inequalities since the introduction of agriculture, noted in the 
previous section. With the transition from hunting and gathering to farming and 
husbandry as the basis of food production, larger and more productive societies 
came into existence, in which both “horizontal” and “vertical” differentiation 
took place – division of labour between people who specialised in different 
productive activities, and growing differences of power, property, and prestige. 
Some people in these societies specialised in activities with which they extract-
ed production surplus from the food producers and could accumulate power 
resources. Among the powerful and privileged groups were priests, who spe-
cialised in religious knowledge and rituals, and warriors, who specialised in the 
use of force based on the possession of weapons (Goudsblom 1996b). Warriors 
who exercised regular power in a given territory became the rulers of states, 
levying taxes or tributes from the subjected population. With the growth of 
markets in connection with the growing division of labour, some merchants too 
were able to acquire considerable amounts of property, which served as a pow-
er resource for further wealth accumulation. While these groups profited from 
the growth of networks of interdependence – integration – they also often ac-
tively contributed to it. Priests did so by spreading religious beliefs and practic-
es (particularly since the invention of writing), warriors by military conquests, 
merchants by establishing long-distance trade relations (McNeill and McNeill 
2003).  
While processes of functional differentiation, integration and stratification – 
that is, growing differences of power, property, and prestige – were closely 
intertwined during large parts of human history, this does not mean that the 
 
7  In a note, Wouters quotes my statement “If there is a connection between functional differ-
entiation and growing networks of interdependence on the one hand and decreasing ine-
quality of power and privileges on the other, it is apparently valid for only specific historical 
periods under specific conditions” (Wilterdink 2017, 29). He then comments: “The word ‘on-
ly’ suggests a deficiency, but a social science that aims for timeless universal truths is surely 
deficient. Social developments and connections can only [sic] be understood and explained 
from their specific historical period and specific conditions” (Wouters 2020, 305, note 9). 
First, I do not think that a social science that aims for timeless universal truths is “surely 
deficient”; it is perfectly legitimate and even inevitable that social scientists make state-
ments on the highest level of generality. Second, it seems that Wouters claims a “timeless 
universal truth” by suggesting that differentiation and integration always and everywhere 
implicate functional democratisation. Third, as I try to make clear in this paper, it is precisely 
my aim to understand and explain processes of functional democratisation “from their spe-
cific historical period and their specific conditions.” 
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first two processes always and automatically lead to the third. Differentiation 
does not necessarily entail hierarchisation or stratification. Integration can have 
both equalising and disequalising effects. 
It is particularly the concept of “integration” that needs clarification, since it 
has various, mostly vague meanings and strong positive normative connota-
tions. It was a core concept in sociological functionalism, in which it was more 
or less equated with social order (Parsons 1951, esp. 36-7). In present-day 
popular and political discourse, the concept usually refers to ethnic minorities; 
a minority is regarded as “integrated” into the national society to the extent that 
its members behave like “normal” citizens – have regular work, do not drop out 
from school, have frequent contacts with non-minority members of the society, 
participate in non-minority institutions, and have taken over the culture (lan-
guage, norms, customs) prevalent in the wider society. “Lack of integration” is 
defined as a problem. In Elias’s non-normative processual view, “integration” 
refers to processes by which more people over larger distances become more 
interdependent; or, in other words, to the growth and increasing density of 
networks of interdependence. 
This is an acceptable terminology, but it is also problematic in view of the 
positive connotations of the term “integration,” which may easily lead to con-
fusion. It is not far-fetched to suppose that Wouters has fallen prey to it. When 
integration is good, it must implicate developments that are regarded as good – 
civilisation and informalisation, functional democratisation and decrease of 
inequalities. Increase of power inequalities can then be only understood as 
resulting from deviations from integration – as “disintegration” 8 or “defunc-
tionalisation”9 (Wouters 2020, 306-12, 332). Actually, these “deviations” can 
have the effect of a decrease of power differences (see notes 8 and 9). And it is 
not difficult to see that integration in the broad, Eliasian, non-normative sense 
can lead to an increase of power inequalities – if one keeps in mind that “more 
interdependence” does not necessarily mean more reciprocal or mutual interde-
 
8  See, for example, Wouters’s assertion, quoted in the text, that functional democratisation 
was among the dominant trends in human history “notwithstanding counter movements 
such as the disintegration of the Roman Empire into the Dark Ages.” Actually, inequalities of 
power and wealth in the Roman Empire were near the possible maximum, and with its dis-
integration these inequalities diminished (Scheidel 2017, 264-9). 
9  Defuctionalisation, or loss of functions of a particular group, may lead to either increasing 
or decreasing power inequality, depending on the initial power position of that group: when 
a group with little power resources loses functions (such as the handloom weavers in indus-
trialising England around 1800), this results in a growth of power inequality in relation to 
more powerful groups; when, on the other hand, the group that loses functions is relatively 
powerful, this “defunctionalisation” will result in decreasing power differences in relation to 
other, initially less powerful groups. An example of the latter, described by Tocqueville 
(1967[1856]), is the loss of functions of the land-owning nobility in the French ancien ré-
gime and the concomitant weakening of its power position with respect to the bourgeoisie. 
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pendence, but may involve the extension and strengthening of one-sided, high-
ly a-symmetrical interdependency relations. 
A clear example is the integration of larger groups of people into an expand-
ing state territory through military conquest. In this way, long chains of strong-
ly one-sided and highly a-symmetrical interdependence are established, imply-
ing the extension of very uneven power relations. Thus, the military expansion 
of agrarian empires – the Chinese, the Roman, the Ottoman Empire, to mention 
a few – brought enormous inequalities of power and wealth within these vast 
territories. Another example, mentioned above, is the expansion of European 
power since the late 15th century through the combination of trade and force. 
Increasing numbers of people all over the world were integrated into an ex-
panding global figuration dominated by European merchants, capital owners, 
and political rulers in which inequalities sharply increased.  
How are, then, changes in the direction of diminishing power differences 
explained? The historical instances of temporary and limited functional democ-
ratisation that I referred to can be understood in connection with processes of 
both integration and disintegration. In Ancient Greece, the disintegration of the 
kingdoms of what is known as the Mycenaean civilisation since about 1200 
BCE prepared the ground for the emergence of hundreds of politically autono-
mous city-states which developed relatively egalitarian power relations among 
the “free” male members of these local societies (Scheidel 2017, 188-9, 270-4). 
As pointed out, crucial conditions for this partial democratisation were strong 
inter-state competition and a concomitant high degree of military mobilisation 
in each of the city-states. The competitive pressures towards integration in 
these communities took the form of intense relations of mutual interdependence 
among the citizens, leading to relatively even power balances among them. 
When these small political units were integrated into larger states, the interde-
pendencies within these communities became weaker and less reciprocal, re-
sulting in growing inequality. 
Something similar could be said about the partial democratisation in medi-
aeval towns in Europe. Their emergence as communities with some degree of 
political autonomy resulted from the disintegration of the empire that had been 
formed in the reign of Charlemagne, followed by increasing division of labour 
(functional differentiation) and growth of trade (market integration) in which 
the towns had a central role (Elias 2012a, 224 ff.). Here too, competition be-
tween urban communities – though less violent than in the case of Ancient 
Greece – and conflicts with other powers (noble warriors in particular) stimu-
lated strong and relatively symmetrical interdependencies within these commu-
nities. In both cases, it was not “integration” as such that was conducive to 
functional democratisation, but integration of a specific nature and on a specific 
level – within relatively small, dense, clearly bounded local communities that 
were confronted with strong competitive pressures. 
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The processes of integration that were conducive to trends of functional de-
mocratisation within Western nation-states from the 19th century show similar-
ities as well as differences with these historical cases. Like then, these process-
es took place within bounded communities that strongly competed with one 
another. But the scale was very different: the communities were now national 
states that comprised many millions of people living in territories of tens of 
thousands of square miles. Integration on this scale involved the lengthening 
and intensification of chains of interdependence through commercialisation, 
industrialisation, increasing geographical mobility (facilitated by such techno-
logical innovations as trains and motor cars), increasing long-distance commu-
nication, and state bureaucratisation. While these processes, except the last one, 
also occurred on international and global scales, they were more intense within 
the borders of the industrialising nation-states. Thus, industrial firms in the 
19th century and the first half of the 20th century were usually “national” firms 
in the sense that they were located in one country and the owners, managers, 
and employees of the firm were citizens of that same country, which also con-
stituted the firm’s primary sales’ market. An important driving force for na-
tional interdependencies to become not only stronger but also more mutual and 
reciprocal was the intense and increasing economic, political and military com-
petition between the industrialising nation-states. Inter-state competition put 
increasing pressure on national governments and leading groups to discipline 
and mobilise the whole national population for national prosperity and power. 
With these efforts, governments and private organisations extended their con-
trol, but in turn became more dependent on the masses of the population they 
aimed to control. In other words, functional democratisation was strongly con-
nected with increasing international tensions, accompanied and reinforced by 
intense national we-feelings and fiery nationalism (cf. Elias 2010, 184-8). One 
of its manifestations was the (re-)introduction of general military conscription 
in most European states in the second half of the 19th century, which extended 
government control but also made the government more dependent on armed 
citizens (Andreski 1954). In other respects too, increasing government control, 
bureaucratic regulation and disciplinary efforts on the part of leading groups – 
compulsory public education, “civilising offensives” (Flint et al. 2015), regula-
tion of working conditions and working hours – went hand in hand with the 
growth of more mutual, less one-sided interdependencies between governments 
and governed, dominant and dominated classes. This was manifested in the 
extension of citizenship rights (Marshall 1963), including the right to vote for, 
and to be voted in, political bodies with decision-making power. 
All this took place in what I called the first phase of functional democratisa-
tion in Western nation-states, from the second half of the 19th century to the 
outbreak of the First World War. In the second phase (1914-1945), the rivalry 
between European states culminated into two “total” wars in which all groups 
of the population of the belligerent nation-states were involved. The pressures 
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toward more reciprocal interdependencies on a national scale reached a climax 
in this period, resulting in accelerated trends of functional democratisation. In 
all European states – as well as, to a lesser extent, the United States – class 
inequalities strongly diminished in this period. In the third, postwar phase, 
pressures toward national integration on a reciprocal basis remained strong. 
There was a commonly felt urgency to “rebuild” the damaged national econo-
mies and to restore national industries. Another kind of pressure came from the 
“Cold War” tensions between the Western countries under US leadership and 
the Soviet bloc. Moreover, strong economic growth enabled governments to 
build a generous welfare state with equalising effects on disposable incomes.  
These conditions in favour of functional democratisation have weakened 
since the 1970s. Industrial companies that had been national became multi- and 
transnational, spreading their investments and production facilities over differ-
ent countries in the world. Cold War tensions became weaker and finally dis-
appeared. And the costs of welfare state provisions expanded to such a degree 
that they evoked increasing resistance, particularly among economically privi-
leged and powerful groups. These changes paved the way for the tendencies of 
functional de-democratisation that became manifest from the 1980s. 
5.  Back to the Present 
In the last two sections of his article, Wouters (2020, 320-32) presents his ideas 
about recent developments in the world, the present state of affairs, and the 
future. This is perhaps the most interesting part of his essay, though it is quite 
unsystematic and very selective. In this final section I will try to give, in very 
broad outlines, a somewhat more systematic and inclusive view. 
As noted, Wouters recognises a growth of inequalities during the past few 
decades. He relates this, correctly I think, to a shift in the balance of power 
between state politicians and business people in favour of the latter. This seems 
to be true for at least Western state-societies. But how is this shift related to 
globalisation? Though the word “globalisation” is part of the title of Wouters’s 
article, he does not say much about it. 
Globalisation can be regarded as a continuation of the long-term process of 
integration – the lengthening and intensification of chains of interdependence 
on a global scale. This process accelerated in the 1970s, when cross-border 
investments and financial flows grew precipitously and industrial companies 
became more and more transnational, relocating parts of their production to 
low-wage countries (Dicken 1992). In this same decade, China started its re-
forms toward a capitalist and export-oriented economy. The fall of communist 
regimes in the area of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe around 1990 inte-
grated these countries too into the capitalist world-economy. This whole devel-
opment was instigated by private companies as well as national governments 
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and intergovernmental bodies, including the World Trade Organization, the 
International Monetary Fund, and, on the regional level, the European Union. It 
was laid down in numerous trade agreements that gave freedom to cross-border 
capital movements and protected investments abroad, and it was greatly facili-
tated by technological innovations in information, communication, and 
transport. Neo-liberalism, as it came to be called, was the dominant ideology 
that legitimated these changes by proclaiming that free, minimally regulated 
markets would guarantee growing prosperity for everyone.  
As a consequence of this process – in combination with the weakening of 
the pressures toward national integration noted above – inter-class interdepend-
encies within Western national states became weaker and more one-sided. 
Owners and managers of transnational corporations and investments funds won 
power in relation to the majority of workers who remained much more tied to 
the nation-state. This shift was manifested in the weakening of labour unions 
(in terms of membership and bargaining power), the growing share of capital 
income and the decreasing share of labour income in national income, the 
increase of income and wealth inequality, and the strong growth in the number 
of “flexible” jobs with fluctuating and insecure incomes. Capital owners and 
company managers increased their power and autonomy in relation to national 
governments, which became more dependent on them for nation-wide prosperi-
ty and employment, and were increasingly inclined to adapt to their wishes and 
interests. One manifestation of this pro-business and pro-market orientation 
was the lowering of tax rates for corporations, entrepreneurs, capital owners 
and high-income earners since the 1980s in all Western countries (Piketty 
2020, 448-9, 549-55). Political parties that claimed to represent the interests of 
the underprivileged classes – such as the Democratic Party in the United States, 
the Labour Party in the United Kingdom or the Social Democratic Parties on 
the European continent – largely supported or even initiated such policies, 
severing or weakening their ties with labour unions. The far-reaching deregula-
tion and globalisation of financial markets made investors and money traders 
more independent from controlling agencies and enhanced the opportunities for 
spectacular enrichment through financial operations, including tax evasion. It is 
apt to conceptualize this whole multi-faceted development as “functional de-
democratisation,” as it represents a reversal of the previous dominant trend of 
functional democratisation and can be explained from the same theoretical 
perspective. 
Yet that does not mean that there has been a complete reversal to functional 
de-democratisation in all respects and at all levels. The same processes of glob-
alisation that had a weakening effect on inter-class interdependencies in West-
ern state-societies tended to strengthen transnational interdependencies and to 
make them less one-sided, since these processes involved the transfer of tech-
nological, commercial, and organisational knowledge. The opening of markets 
in poorer countries provided new opportunities not only for Western (and Japa-
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nese) companies, but also for native entrepreneurs. Whereas economic growth 
in Western countries slowed down, it speeded up in populous Asian countries 
such as, most notably, China and, to a lesser extent, India. The result is an 
overall decrease of economic inequality between countries since the 1980s, 
though with strong regional variations. At the same time, economic inequality 
within most countries increased.10 Among the “winners of globalisation” were 
not only the rich all over the world, but also broad middle groups in relatively 
poor countries, particularly in Asia; among the “losers” were the poor in the 
poorest countries and the working and lower-middle classes in the rich Western 
countries (Milanovic 2016). All in all, Western dominance in the world-
economy diminished during the past 40 years, following the decline of Europe-
an political power in the post-war years of decolonisation. 
Related to this global development and in connection with preceding func-
tional democratisation, power inequalities within Western societies along the 
axis of race and ethnicity tended to diminish. In the United States, this is a 
recent phase in a long, slow, and conflict-ridden development that started with 
the abolition of slavery after the Civil War in 1865. Official racial segregation, 
backed by legal rules and political authority, continued in the Southern states 
until the 1960s. Though informal and hidden racial discrimination remained 
widespread since then, opportunities for upward social mobility by people of 
colour widened, and this tendency did not stop when economic inequalities 
began to grow in the late 1970s. While African Americans and members of 
other ethnic-racial minorities were particularly hit by unemployment, reduc-
tions of welfare payments, and stagnating or declining wage levels from the 
1980s, correlations between ethnic-racial identity and socio-economic position 
continued to weaken, even if slowly (Wilson 1987; Landry and Marsh 2011). A 
similar development took place in Western Europe, where many descendants of 
immigrants from poorer, non-European countries who had come to Europe to 
fulfill low-paid jobs improved their position in comparison to their parents, in 
spite of practices of negative discrimination. 
Another, clearer, instance of a continuing trend of diminishing power differ-
ences in Western societies concerns the relations between the sexes. From the 
late 19th century onwards, women gained social strength in relation to men, 
manifested in the equalisation of formal rights, the expansion of women’s 
educational and occupational opportunities, and their growing share in posi-
tions of authority and prestige (de Swaan 2019: 80-125, 252-7; cf. Wouters 
 
10  It is not quite clear what both trends together imply for global income inequality, conceived 
as the sum of income inequality between and within countries. While Milanovic (2016, 188 
ff.) concludes that global inequality decreased from 1988 to 2011, the World Inequality Re-
port 2018 ascertains that global inequality since 1980 has increased (quoted by Wouters 
2020, 329). Both sources agree, however, that overall income inequality between countries 
has decreased since 1980 (Alvaredo et al. 2018, 11, 13, 58-66). 
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2004). Relations of interdependence between men and women became less 
one-sided and more reciprocal, as also appeared in men’s growing share in 
domestic work and child care among married couples.  
Both of these ongoing tendencies towards functional democratisation are in 
tune with the widespread ideology of meritocracy, which is a central element of 
neo-liberalism. The ideal free market in the neoliberal image is non-
discriminatory, an arena of fair and open competition in which the best will be 
the most successful. Entrance to this imagined market is open to everyone, 
irrespective of race, ethnicity, or gender. The meritocratic ideology justifies 
inequality on the basis of an assumed equality of opportunity – as the outcome 
of fair competition and the reflection of differences in merits, that is, personal 
capacities plus efforts. It therefore condemns discrimination on the basis of 
ethnic background, skin colour, gender, sexual preferences, or religious affilia-
tion. And to the extent that meritocratic norms are put into practice, this con-
tributes to decreasing inequality along these lines. 
However, the neoliberal-meritocratic ideology denies or neglects particular-
ly two basic sources of inequality of opportunities: class inequalities within 
countries which are, to a large extent, transmitted over generations11; and the 
inequalities between the inhabitants of different countries, maintained by state 
borders and nationality rights, and reinforced by restrictions on migration. 
Growing inequalities in living conditions contribute to increasing inequality of 
opportunity, as has become most apparent in the United States, the country 
where the belief in equality of opportunity (the “American dream”) has been 
traditionally the most widespread (Mennell 2007, 249-50). Intergenerational 
class mobility in this country decreased over the past decades and became 
lower than in Western Europe (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010, 157-63; Stiglitz 
2019, 44-5, 279-80). A second basic source of inequality of opportunity con-
sists in the continuous importance of state borders. Formal and practical barri-
ers to international migration contradict the neoliberal image of an integrated 
global market in which the production factors capital and labour move freely 
from one place in the world to another. In actual practice, economic globalisa-
tion from the 1970s meant primarily the increasingly free movement of physi-
cal and financial capital, whereas the international movement of labour – that 
is, of people – remained much more restricted.  
It is remarkable that Wouters does not pay attention to the ongoing trends 
towards functional democratisation just mentioned, which could have given 
some empirical substance to his claim that functional democratisation has re-
mained the dominant trend in the contemporary world, in spite of rising ine-
qualities. Nor does he say anything about recent tendencies in the opposite 
 
11  Through what Bourdieu (1986) has termed economic capital (especially inherited wealth), 
cultural capital (especially educational opportunities related to parental upbringing), and 
social capital (access to advantageous social networks). 
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direction, toward de-democratisation, that are related to the emergence and 
growing impact of populist nationalism. 
Populist nationalism that won strength in various parts of the world in the 
new millennium can be interpreted as a counter response of resistance to, on 
the one hand, the mentioned tendencies of ongoing functional democratisation 
(as it is nativistic and contains elements of hidden or open racism and sexism) 
and, on the other hand, the trend of functional de-democratisation related to 
globalisation. In the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States we see 
these elements combined. His nativistic nationalism, covert racism, and anti-
globalism feed on emotions of discontent among the white American working 
and middle classes who feel that they are losing security and status in compari-
son to former outsider groups (Hochschild 2016). Trumpian politics is, on the 
one hand, a break with neo-liberalism, as it comprises the resurrection of trade 
barriers and a (partial) retreat from intergovernmental bodies such as the WTO 
that stimulate market globalisation; on the other hand it is a continuation or 
even radicalisation of neo-liberalism as it implies a breakdown of government 
control in favour of private companies and further tax reductions for the rich. 
The result is strengthened de-democratisation, a further growth of economic 
inequality combined with authoritarian political leadership that undermines the 
institutions of liberal democracy.  
Similar developments can be observed in many other countries today, rang-
ing from Poland and Hungary to Turkey, Brazil, India, and Russia. In all these 
countries, authoritarian leaders who claim to represent “the people” challenge, 
damage, or destroy liberal-democratic rules that protect cultural plurality and 
minority rights, and propagate an aggressive nationalism, often connected with 
a particular religion, which stresses sharp boundaries between the national we-
group and other people, and is directed against supposed enemies inside and 
outside the borders of the state. These tendencies of political de-
democratisation can be interpreted as manifestations of broader functional de-
democratisation, in which the power differentials between governments and 
governed increase and economic inequalities among different social strata also 
grow. In Western European countries, parties with similar ideas have come to 
the fore, deriving inspiration from these authoritarian regimes (Mudde 2007; 
Wilterdink 2017, 35-9).  
This world-wide movement can be understood as an outcome of the delegit-
imation of what may be called progressive neo-liberalism. After the fall of 
Soviet communism, the United States seemed to have become the unchallenged 
world hegemon. The Washington Consensus of the 1990s, embodied in the 
American president Bill Clinton (1992-2000), combined the neo-liberal goals 
of deregulation, privatisation, and market globalisation with a support of inter-
governmental organisations (including the United Nations) and a defence of 
liberal democracy and human rights. This hegemonic international “consen-
sus,” which was never unchallenged, has disappeared under the impact of a 
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series of events and processes. Among them were the disastrous consequences 
of the invasion in Iraq, the deep financial crisis of 2008, the emergence of 
China as a new world power, the effects of mass immigration, the threats of 
global climate change, and, not least, the ongoing growth of economic inequali-
ties within nation-states. All these changes have undermined the neoliberal 
belief in “the market” as the basis of social progress, but also weakened the 
institutions of liberal democracy.  
There is much unclarity and dissensus about what might come out of the 
present confusing situation. According to an optimistic progressive scenario, 
recently proposed by Piketty (2020, 966-1034), it is possible and desirable to 
extend the institutions of liberal democracy to supranational levels – the Euro-
pean Union, to begin with – in order to regulate and control markets, private 
companies, and wealthy capital owners much more effectively than can be 
done by national states, and much more in accordance with the interests and 
wishes of the less privileged classes. This positive scenario would mean a re-
reversal of the present dominant development into the direction of renewed 
functional democratisation. According to another scenario, however, the forces 
of global integration will take a very different turn: China, with its enormous 
capacities for economic growth, technological innovation, and large-scale 
collective action, will surpass declining America and weak, divided Europe, 
and become the new world hegemon, the model followed by other countries. 
This would imply a strong movement in the direction of functional de-
democratisation, as China exemplifies most clearly the combination of increas-
ing economic inequality and increasing authoritarian state control. It is more 
likely, however, that neither of these two scenarios will become realised, and 
that different political and economic systems will continue to compete with one 
another. The best we can hope for, I think, is that increasingly transparent in-
tergovernmental cooperation on the global level and increasing supranational 
coordination on the European level will enhance the capacity for collective 
action in order to solve common problems for humanity, ranging from tax 
evasion to climate change. 
As I have argued in this article, processes of functional democratisation and 
functional de-democratisation do not exclude one another; they can go togeth-
er, on different levels, in different respects, along different axes; they have 
gone together in different societies and periods, including the recent decades; 
and it is likely that they will continue to go together, in various ways, for the 
foreseeable future. It makes no sense to avoid and reject the notion of function-
al de-democratisation, and to assume, against all evidence, that functional 
democratisation is a fundamental, essential, natural, dominant process in the 
whole of human history, inextricably bound up with differentiation and integra-
tion (and civilisation and informalisation), and revealing the future that lies 
ahead. This assumption is a far cry from empirical and historical sociology. It 
is metaphysics in the Comtean sense (cf. Elias 2012b, 28-45). 
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